Technology of Freedom: An Exposition


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Structures of Freedom

Principles of Design

Invocation: Song of Creation (Rg Veda)

Metaphysics of Nonconformity

Metaphysics means general statements about reality, as of fact. Metaphysics can be useful, even if erroneous. "A false hypothesis is better than none at all..." (Goethe)

Some popular systems of metaphysics (click on for reference and context):

Bible-based belief
"Being made in the image of God means thinking his thoughts after him and conforming one's actions to those thoughts. "
Immanuel Kant
"...objects must conform to our knowledge."
Mathematics
"...facts must always conform to logic and arithmetic." (Bertrand Russell)
Physics
"... the atoms in the brain are subject to the same all-inclusive physical laws that govern every other form of matter." (Marvin Minsky) (with a response)
Natural Law
"...there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid." (interpretation by H. L. A. Hart)

These systems have a common premise: inherent conformity between reality and experience. Each system declares that reality is governed by laws that we can discover and follow. Each system condemns deviations from conformity, using such names as sin, illusion, meaninglessness, superstition or perversity.

All of these systems fail to deal with the full reality of human existence. Although each system has been a vehicle for intellectual advancement, none actually arrives at a satisfactory destination. All are blind to the freedom we exercise continually in ordinary work and daily life, such as using imprecise directions to reach a destination in a strange city or writing a paper by selecting and arranging ideas drawn from a mass.

In these pages, I propose a new metaphysics. Its premise declares that experience and reality do not conform of their own nature: Experience is inherently structured, but reality is not inherently structured. Laws and rules are human inventions that sometimes approximate reality closely, but sometimes not. The appearance of exact conformity is established in artificial, constrained environments, such as laboratories, courts, society and the marketplace.

This metaphysics of nonconformity says that there is confusion at the interface of experience and reality. We perceive this confusion as disorder.We experience confusion and disorder when events shake the structures of our experience. We also experience them during ordinary work and daily life when we must deal with unstructured reality . For some of us, they seem to emerge from the depths of the self.

Confusion and disorder are an irreducible fact of life. We are not able to resolve them in a general way, but we can do so on specific occasions through an exercise of freedom.

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Exercise of Freedom

  1. We build structures, from reality into experience and into reality through action.
  2. Structures and reality conform only imperfectly and after labor.
  3. We exercise freedom while building structures.
  4. The building is always incomplete, ongoing and filled with error.
Structures are not in reality, except to the extent we put them there. Structures are a product of processes that generate experience. They are artifacts and, if held to a standard imposed by reality, are infected with systematic error.

Establishing new structures and revising old ones is the labor of freedom. Through an exercise of freedom, we can impose order, our order, on what we perceive as disorder and confusion.

Some parts of reality can be ordered by different kinds of structures and reality divides for us into parts or domains according to the kinds of structures we use.

A structure serves as a vehicle for experiments, in a home, laboratory, marketplace, courtroom or other practical setting. Successes and failures define the domain of appropriate application. In some domains, it seems that we can squeeze out disorder almost to the vanishing point. In other domains, disorder is clearly incorrigible.

When we look at reality, we see the structures we have built. They have a hypnotic effect: we come to believe that reality is structured and that particular structures extend throughout the whole of reality. A desire to believe that we can comprehend reality predisposes us to being hypnotized by our structures.

Reality breaks through the hypnotic effect when actual experience is contrary to the structured expectation.

Reality also breaks through when different persons live through opposing structures. Trials in court present a forum for the opposition of structures: each side has a version of reality competing for the consciousness of the judge or jury -- and the judge or jury may return with yet another version.

Reality also breaks through when structures based on different domains do not fit together. This condition is sometimes called cognitive dissonance. Artists create beauty by crafting harmonious unities out of disparate elements.

We are bewildered by hypnotic structures in cultures different from our own or in other times. We cannot understand the medieval social, religious and intellectual order that resulted in philosopher Giordano Bruno being burnt at the stake in 1600. The Holocaust that wiped out European Jewry in this century is incomprehensible, although based on a structure of racist ideas that appeared sensible to perpetrators whose personalities were otherwise unexceptionable, even "banal". (Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem).

Fighters for freedom break the hynosis of social and political structures. Even if new hypnotic structures are erected in place of the old, history records the growth of freedom as our structures change and grow.

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Ambiguity Structures

We can sometimes organize disorder by means of structured contexts. The disorder is not wholly reduced to order, but broken up and confined, partially analyzed by reference to the confining structures and made susceptible to resolution in a piecemeal fashion. The result is a marriage of order and disorder, leading to ambiguity structures.

Ambiguity structures are built out of elements. Some elements are definite and mechanical. Other elements, "ambiguities," are indefinite and call upon us to exercise freedom. In ambiguity structures, ambiguities are components that can be parts of other elements, including ambiguities within ambiguities.

I originally encountered ambiguity structures in the practice of law. (Example: O. J. Simpson civil trial). Here, however, there is only minor reference to law or legal practice. Instead, the website is built around engineered ambiguity structures, constructed as examples.

Electronic devices interpret some ambiguity structures and serve as a vehicle for their development.

The first device is a rudimentary, flat, and quasi-static associative memory of a traditional kind. Later devices involve re-organization, extension and planned dynamical activation. Each device incorporates its predecessors. The devices are applied to successively more difficult problems, thereby reaching toward the reality of disorder that defies comprehension by mechanical analogs.

The final form, as presently conceived, is a device where stabilities and instabilities interact. These are interpreted as interactions of ordering structures and disorder involved in ambiguity structures. I suggest that the interactions resemble the interplay of perception, memory and consciousness in human intelligence and that such interplay is freedom.


These pages are the work of:

Robert Kovsky
Post Office Box 240
Oakland, CA 94604

e-mail
rlk@best.com
A copy of the website is available on disc formatted for IBM personal computers.

The author welcomes comments and criticism.

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All materials copyright by Robert Kovsky, 1997.

Royce Gordon Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding: the Philosophical Framework for Biblical Interpretation at 64 and 68 (Zondervan Publishing House 1991):

"A comprehensive Christian philosophy that works from God's authoritative disclosure of himself in creation and in Scripture will lay claim to the positive role of rational thinking, sensory experience, and spiritual communion with God. ... Idealism is therefore not only a valid but an inescapable function of the human mind. Being made in the image of God means thinking his thoughts after him and conforming one's actions to those thoughts. But precisely here the substantial difference between biblical idealism and humanistic idealism can be discerned. Biblical idealism is grounded in the belief that truthful ideas have their origin in the primordial ideas of God, not in the human mind. Accordingly, they are ultimately referential to the creative thoughts and acts of God. God's universe therefore has real existence, and because of his presence in framing creation, this reality communicates its noumenal (real), not just its phenomenal (apparent) meaning to the human mind through the empirical senses."

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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the 2nd ed. ("B") at xvi (Kemp Smith trans.)

"The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed point of view by which they have so greatly benefited. ... Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have on this assumption ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility."

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Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy at 77, 85, 86-87 (Oxford University Press paperback published in 1959 and based on first publication, 1912)

"All pure mathematics is a priori, like logic. ...

It seems strange that we should apparently be able to know some truths in advance about particular things of which we have as yet no experience; but it cannot easily be doubted that logic and arithmetic will apply to such things. We do not know who will be inhabitants of London a hundred years hence; but we know that any two of them and any other two them will make four of them. This apparent power of anticipating things of which we have no experience is certainly surprising. Kant's solution of the problem, though not valid in my opinion, is interesting. ...

Apart from minor grounds on which Kant's philosophy may be criticized, there is one main objection which seems fatal to any attempt to deal with the problem of a priori knowledge by his method. The thing to be accounted for is our certainty that facts must always conform to logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for this. Our nature is as much a fact of the existing world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will remain constant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This possiblility seems never to have occured to him, yet it is one which utterly destroys the certainty and universality which he is anxious to vindicate for arithmetical propositions."

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Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (1985)

Section 2.2, "Novelists and Reductionists"

" ...The science of physics can now explain virtually everything we see, at least in principle, in terms of how a very few kinds of particles and force-fields interact. Over the past few centuries reductionism has been remarkably successful. What makes it possible to describe so much of the world in terms of so few basic rules? No one knows.

Many scientists look on chemistry and physics as ideal models of what psychology should be like. After all, the atoms in the brain are subject to the same all-inclusive physical laws that govern every other form of matter. "


Sections 30.6 ("Freedom of Will") and 30.7 ("The Myth of the Third Alternative")

"According to the modern scientific view, there is simply no room at all for 'freedom of the human will.' Everything that happens in our universe is either completely determined by what's already happened in the past or else depends, in part, on random chance. Everything, including what's happening in our brains, depends on these and only on these:

A set of fixed deterministic laws A purely random set of accidents

There is no room on either side for any third alternative. Whatever actions we may 'choose,' they cannot make the slightest change in what otherwise might have been -- because those rigid, natural laws already caused the states of mind that caused us to decide that way. And if that choice was in part made by chance -- it still leaves nothing for us to decide. ...

To save our belief in the freedom of will from the fateful grasps of Cause and Chance, people simply postulate an empty, third alternative. We imagine that somewhere in each person's mind, there lies a Spirit, Will, or Soul, so well concealed that it can elude the reach of any law -- or lawless accident.

I've drawn the box for Will so small because we're always taking things out of it -- and scarcely ever putting things in! This is because whenever we find some scrap of order in the world, we have to attribute it to Cause -- and whenever things seem to obey no law at all, we attribute it to Chance. This means that the dominion controlled by Will can only hold what, up to now, we don't yet understand."

Response to the metaphysics of physics

Return to quotations of metaphysical systems

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), Chapter IX ("Law and Morals"), Section 1., ("Natural Law and Legal Positivism"):

"Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done. so. But just because those who have taken this view have either been silent or differed very much concerning the nature of morality, it is necessary to consider two very different forms in which Legal Positivism has been rejected. One of these is expressed most clearly in the classical theories of Natural Law: that there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid. The other takes a different, less rationalist view of morality, and offers a different account of the ways in which legal validity is connnected with moral value. "

(The "other ... less rationalist view" is based on "certain rules of conduct which any social organization must contain if it is to be viable.")

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Civil Trial Jury Verdict Form for Rufo v. Simpson
(The O. J. Simpson Civil Trial)

This was the document the jury took into the jury room and used to decide the case.

It poses a series of questions. Clear, even mechanical, consequences follow from the answers, but the questions themselves are indefinite, and there is a general grant of freedom to the jury to make decisions.

The imprecise language is partially explained to provide guidance. For example, the judge instructed the jury as follows:

" 'Preponderance of the evidence' means evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so evenly balanced that you're unable to say that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against the party who had the burden of proving it."

" 'Clear and convincing evidence' means evidence of such convincing force that it demonstrates, in contrast to the opposing evidence, a high probability of the truth of the fact for which it is offered as proof. Such evidence requires a higher standard of proof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence."


Civil Trial Jury Verdict Form

SPECIAL VERDICT

We, the jury of the above-entitled action, find the following special verdict on the questions submitted to us:

Question No. 1: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Simpson wilfully and wrongfully caused the death of Ronald Goldman?

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no," do not answer Question Nos. 2, 3, and 4, and instead proceed to Question No. 5. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes," proceed to Question No. 2.

Question No. 2: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Simpson committed battery against Ronald Goldman?

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If your answer to Question No. 2 is "yes," proceed to Question No. 3.

If your answer to Question No. 2 is "no," do not answer Question Nos. 3 and 4, and instead proceed to Question No. 5.

Question No. 3: Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Simpson committed oppression in the conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for battery against Ronald Goldman.

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 2, proceed to Question No. 4.

Question No. 4: Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Simpson committed malice in the conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for battery against Ronald Goldman. Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

Proceed to Question No. 5.

Question No. 5: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Simpson committed battery against Nicole Brown Simpson?

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If your answer to Question No. 5 is "yes," proceed to Question No. 6.

If your answers to Question Nos. 1 and 5 are "no," proceed to date, sign, and return the verdict form.

Question No. 6: Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Simpson committed oppression in the conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for battery against Nicole Brown Simpson?

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 5, proceed to Question No. 7.

Question No. 7: Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Simpson committed malice in the conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for battery against Nicole Brown Simpson?

Write the answer "yes" or "no" below.

Yes No

Answer: _____ _____

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 1, answer Question No. 8.

Question No. 8: We award damages against defendant Simpson and in favor of plaintiffs Goldman and Rufo, in the aggregate, as follows:

Amount

Answer: $_______

Date, sign, and return the verdict form.

DATED: _____, 1997 ________________ FOREPERSON


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Response to the Metaphysics of Physics

Physicists have investigated properties of matter and formulated "mathematical laws" based on their investigations. The investigations have always involved conditions of isolation, constraint and simplicity, whether occurring naturally (as in space relatively devoid of matter or in isolated stars) or in the laboratory. A hypothesis that the results of the investigations can be made as close as desired to the "mathematical laws" by imposing sufficiently strict conditions of isolation, constraint and simplicity is consistent with the evidence. Also consistent with the evidence is the hypothesis that, as those conditions are relaxed, the "mathematical laws" are approximations only, becoming progressively less exact as those conditions cease to apply. These hypotheses cannot be tested experimentally against the hypothesis (maintained by those who believe in a rationally comprehensible universe) that the "mathematical laws" constitute exact statements of reality universally applicable.

The view of limit and approximation in physical science has been argued by British mathematician and philosopher E. W. Hobson. It resembles the philosophy of science of Karl Popper.

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What it's all about

This website explores the hypothesis that errors are built into all experience -- pervasive, systematic errors. We cannot escape the errors, but we can identify some of them and use knowledge about them to advantage, even embody some of that knowledge on electronic devices.

Through the admission of errors, it is possible to account for mysteries that have perplexed humankind since we first began to question. We know we are free, but we cannot find a place for freedom in our systems of ideas. Our knowledge, particularly science, has many successes; but there are places where it is powerless. Successes are not final, but create new problems. Conclusive answers are never found, and claims to have found them -- by religious leaders, Marxists, behavioral psychologists and computer logicians -- lead to disappointment and even disaster.

Because experience is filled with errors, our lives are sometimes disordered and confused. Disorder often seems to boil up within one's self and frequently appears in the reality that exists outside the self. Between the two regions of disorder stands a structured shell of order that each of us constructs. We want to use the shell to order the self and reality too, but disorder is obstinate and irreducible. When the shell is threatened,we feel anger and fear. People with conflicting structures compete for dominance. Accordingly, I argue, intellectual cognition, principled disputes and feelings are all involved in building, changing and maintaining structured order in the face of disorder. We exercise freedom when engaged in these tasks.

This work develops these ideas and presents them in a hypertext form that suits their nature. There is a systematic portrayal of a form of disorder -- ambiguity and the analysis of ambiguity -- as well as reference to disorder that cannot be analyzed. It is important that the visitor directly encounter disorder, buoyed by belief in ultimate sources of order, even though those sources are beyond our comprehension. Because experience is infected with error, we can never figure things out; hence we are free.

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Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959, 1992).

I am especially fond of an address Prof. Popper gave in 1952 that has been reprinted in Conjectures and Refutations (1963) as "The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science," especially the discussion of Kant's philosophy of science:

"It is perhaps hard for intellectuals of our own day, spolit and blasé as we are by the spectacle of scientific success, to realize what Newton's theory meant, not just for Kant but for any eighteenth-century thinker. ... Newton had discovered the long sought secret. ... In a time like ours, when theories come and go like buses in Picadilly, and when every schoolboy has heard that Newton has long been superseded by Einstein, it is hard to recapture the sense of conviction which Newton's theory inspired, or the sense of elation, and of liberation. A unique event had happened in the history of thought, one which could never be repeated: the first and final discovery of the absolute truth about the universe. An age-old dream had come true. Mankind had obtained knowledge, real, certain, indubitable, and demonstrated knowledge -- divine scientia or episteme, and not merely doxa, human opinion.

...

Thus arose the central problem of the Critique: 'How is pure natural science possible?' By 'pure natural science' -- scientia, episteme -- Kant simply meant Newton's theory.

...

Although the Critique is badly written, although bad grammar abounds in it, this problem is not a linquistic puzzle. Here was knowledge. How could Newton ever attain it? The question was inescapable. But it was also insoluble. For the apparent fact of the attainment of episteme was no fact. As we now know, or believe we know, Newton's theory is no more than a marvellous conjecture, an astonishingly good approximation; unique indeed, but not as divine truth, only as a unique invention of a human genius; not episteme, but belonging to the realm of doxa.

Kant's proposed solution of his insoluble problem consisted of what he proudly called his 'Copernican Revolution' of the problem of knowledge. Knowledge -- episteme -- was possible because we are not passive receptors of sense data, but their active digestors.

...

According to Kant's theory, 'pure natural science' is not only possible; although he does not always realize this, it becomes, contrary to his intention, the necessary result of our mental outfit. ... Thus the problem is no longer how Newton could make his discovery but how everybody else could have failed to make it. How is it that our digestive mechanism did not work much earlier?

And our answer, in the spirit of his Copernican Revolution, might, I suggest be something like this: Because, as you said, we are not passive receptors of sense data, but active organisms. Because we react to our environment not always merely instinctively, but sometimes consciously and freely. Because we can invent myths, stories, theories; because we have a thirst for explanation, an insatiable curiosity, a wish to know. Because we can not only invent stories and theories, but try them out and see whether they work and how they work. Because by a great effort, by trying hard and making mistakes, we may sometimes, if we are lucky, succeed in hitting upon a story, an explanation, which 'saves the phenomena'; perhaps by making up a myth about 'invisibles', such as atoms or gravitational forces, which explain the visible. Because knowledge is an adventure of ideas. These ideas, it is true, are produced by us, and not by the world around us; they are not merely the traces of repeated sensations or stimuli or what not; here you were right. But we are more active and free than even you believed..."

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All materials copyright by Robert Kovsky, 1997.